Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations

Biology

3-2003

Religious Naturalism and Naturalizing Morality
Ursula Goodenough
Washington University in St Louis, goodenough@wustl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bio_facpubs
Part of the Biology Commons, and the Ethics in Religion Commons
Recommended Citation
Goodenough, Ursula, "Religious Naturalism and Naturalizing Morality" (2003). Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations. 99.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bio_facpubs/99

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Biology at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information,
please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.

RELIGIOUS NATURALISM AND NATURALIZING MORALITY
by Ursula Goodenough
Draft of article published in Zygon 38: 101-109 (2003)
Abstract. I first offer some reflections on the term “religious naturalism.” I then outline
how moral thought might be configured in the context of religious naturalism. It is
proposed that the goal of morality is to generate a flourishing community, and that
humans negotiate their social interactions using moral capacities that are cultivated in
the context of culture. Six such capacities are considered: strategic reciprocity,
humaneness, fair-mindedness, courage, reverence, and mindfulness. Moral capacities
are contrasted with moral susceptibilities, fueled by self-interest and brought to the fore
in times of stress and humiliation.

This essay will be in two parts. I will first respond to Jerome Stone’s query as to the
nature of religious naturalism. This is followed by the text of my presentation in the
“Religious Naturalism Today” session at the 2001 AAR meeting in Denver.
RELIGIOUS NATURALISM
Naturalism, as Stone reminds us, is a philosophical position. In this intellectual lineage,
religious naturalism then becomes a theological position. My colleagues in this session,
being theologians, have largely responded in this vein, considering such questions as
how concepts of God can or cannot be rendered coherent within such philosophical
boundaries.
Unaware of this usage, I adopted the term religious naturalism in my book, The
Sacred Depths of Nature (Goodenough, 1998), to best describe its overall perspective.
That perspective does not, however, include much theology. I articulate a Covenant with
Mystery in the presence of apparently unanswerable questions, such as why is there
anything at all rather than nothing, and then proceed to describe my non-theistic
religious orientation in the natural and aesthetic world.
The wild card here seems to be the adjective religious. As I have developed
elsewhere (Goodenough, 2001), and others have certainly noted as well, religions can
be said to have three strands: theological, dealing with God concepts, Meaning,
Purpose; spiritual, dealing with subjective experiences of the sacred; and moral, dealing
with how best to be good. A mature religious tradition interweaves these in the context
of a unifying story or Myth, but each can nonetheless be teased out and analyzed
separately.
The religious naturalism of my book, therefore, might more accurately be
described as spiritual naturalism; I tell of our scientific understandings of who we are and
how we got here, and I respond with such sensibilities as belonging, communion,
gratitude, humility, assent, and awe. It follows that we might as well speak of theological
naturalism and, awkwardly, moral naturalism or, less awkwardly, ethical naturalism, the
term used by Arnhart (1998). Such distinctions may be useful in discourse, but I would

suggest that they not be belabored and that all of us voicing religious responses in a
naturalistic framework, be they theological, spiritual, or moral, feel comfortable using the
term religious naturalism to describe the overall project.
Many traditions have, of course, responded to nature with deep reverence and
gratitude, an orientation that is often called pantheism. Paul Harrison (1999) offers a
lucid historical summary of this religious perspective, and goes on to propose the term
“scientific pantheism” to describe his deeply felt pantheistic orientation in the context of
our current scientific understandings of nature. Phillip Hefner has on occasion referred
to his orientation as “Christian naturalism.” If the overall concept of religious naturalism
proves to be a fertile one, then it will be expected to generate many manifestations with
many names.
There is another matter of terminology to consider here, which is that
“naturalism” and “naturalist” have quite different connotations: whereas the pragmatist
can be said to espouse pragmatism and the empiricist empiricism, the naturalist is not
necessarily someone who espouses the philosophical position of naturalism. Rather, we
think of the naturalist, often quite romantically, as someone at home in the natural world,
and a person who espouses philosophical naturalism is more likely to be described as a
(radical) materialist. “Materialist,” however, carries a particularly large amount of
baggage, from anti-communist propaganda to consumerism to the cold and calculating.
To call oneself a “religious materialist” sounds at best peculiar, whereas “religious
naturalist” invokes our positive valence towards the naturalist, including the naturalist in
each of our selves.
Whether, then, the religious naturalist in fact espouses philosophical naturalism
or has developed some other orientation vis à vis questions of Ultimacy becomes, to my
mind, of secondary importance. That is, I see no inherent conflict between calling
oneself a religious naturalist and experiencing some transcendent relationship with God,
be it a quite abstract God or a traditional personal God. These relationships, I have
discovered in conversations with persons of faith, are often not buttressed by a great
deal of theological infrastructure; they are often ineffable. Ineffability is by definition a
difficult starting point for theological discussion, even as theologians are keenly aware
that it steeps the religious life; nevertheless, it characterizes the theism of many persons
who consider themselves theistic religious naturalists. I would regard as unnecessarily
constrained a definition of religious naturalism that disallows theistic concepts
considered incompatible with philosophical naturalism.
So, returning to the three-stranded view of religion: If we say that religious
naturalists can hold many theological orientations, including those offered here by my
colleagues, and if we say that spiritual naturalism has been invoked by a long lineage of
persons who hold in reverence the splendor that materiality hath wrought, including the
splendor of our evolutionary history and the human spirit, then we are left with the third
facet of religion: morality. My current work is focused on the question of how one might
consider morality in the context of our scientific understanding of nature. It is proving to
be a very challenging question to work with , but here is where I am coming out so far. It
is important to state at the outset that after writing this article I was introduced to
Arnhart’s excellent book, Darwinian Natural Right (1998), which articulates many of the
ideas herein and gives a thorough and thoughtful account of the intellectual history of
ethical naturalism.

MORALITY IN RELIGIOUS NATURALISM
Any religious orientation worth talking about is also concerned with morality. . As
theologian John Haught recently remarked (Haught, 2001): “I would say that in this
recent flurry of news about brain and religion, what is often left out is that religion means
much more than a state of mind or an ecstatic or mystical mood. It’s a commitment over
a lifetime to what a person considers to be good.”
So how do we talk about moral thought and moral action as religious naturalists?
What do we say to our children about how best to be good, and on what basis do we
ground what we say?
My starting premise, working with understandings developed by Foot (2001),
Hursthouse (1999) Woodruff (2001), and their school of contemporary ethicists, is that
morality describes that which allows humans to flourish in community. And given the
relentlessly social context of our lineage, it is vital that we generate flourishing
communities.
Most organisms have no mandate to flourish in community. For most organisms,
their purpose can be said to survive to produce offspring. To say that the purpose of life
is to survive to produce offspring is, for some, an uninspiring and perhaps even bleak
and depressing notion. For others of us, however, it is freighted with wonder and
meaning. That there is life at all, that it is so poignantly purposive, is foundational to the
matrix of my own religious life.
That being said, we in fact need not use such a minimalist word as “survive”. For
the mandate is not so much to survive as to flourish. An organism that manages to eke
out survival and reproduction in a given ecosystem is far less likely to be the ancestor of
a large lineage than an organism that flourishes and produces flourishing progeny in that
ecosystem. “Flourishing” is not a synonym for that old misunderstanding of “fittest”. To
flourish is to be well adapted to the particular environmental circumstance in which one
finds oneself, to be healthy and resilient and resourceful. We can also introduce here
the word “good.” A flourishing bacterium or tree or mouse can be said to be a good
bacterium or tree or mouse. A good willow maximizes the potential for willowness in all
its manifestations: bark quality, disease resistance, pollen production, and so on.
So to return to morality. Most organisms, like bacteria and willows and mice,
carry out their purpose – to flourish – with adaptive traits and behaviors, but their
biological mandate is carried out in the context of self-interest. The project is an
individual project or, in the case of sexual organisms, individuals and their genetic
offspring who require some sort of nurture (seed coats, egg shells, nests, milk).
Social animals like ourselves (and unlike the social insects1) remain selfinterested, but we also cooperate in various vital activities such as food acquisition or
protection from predators. Therefore, the mandate is both to flourish as an individual
and to flourish in community. A good wolf is a flourishing animal and a member of a
flourishing pack; he is genetically scripted both to take care of his own needs and to
cooperate with others in the hunt. A good schooling fish participates in schooling; a
good bird joins others in chasing off the circling hawk. In flourishing social lineages,
adaptive genetic scripts navigate the tensions between self-interest and group
cooperation.

Genetic scripts can specify “instinctive” behaviors, such as schooling, but they
can also specify the capacity to learn adaptive behaviors. That is, the evolutionary
process does not “care” whether behavior is hardwired or learned; it only “cares” about
an adaptive outcome. For primates, whose brains undergo profound transitions from
immaturity to maturity, much of what is inherited is in the form of capacities. Of interest
to us here are capacities for morality, capacities that, when cultivated, allow the
individual to flourish in community. These capacities are cultivated in the context of
learning, that is, in the context of culture, and religious traditions have served as
important cultural venues for moral education throughout human history.
The human who cultivates his or her moral capacities can be said to be a good
human. But it is of course not that simple. Always lurking in the wings of our nature are
what we can call moral susceptibilities, susceptibilities that emanate from the robust selfinterest that we also bring to the project of being alive.
Today I will briefly consider six moral capacities that undergird our ability to
flourish in human community, namely, strategic reciprocity, humaneness, fairmindedness, courage, reverence, and mindfulness. I will argue that these have arisen
during our evolutionary history and have acquired vast additional import and complexity
in the context of our human mentality, a mentality that allows us to engage in symbolic
language and hence to formulate abstractions. These moral capacities stand in tension
with our susceptibilities to greed, hubris, self-absorption, fearfulness, xenophobia, and
prejudice, behaviors that overwhelm us in the face of prolonged stress when we hunker
down and engage not in community but in self-interested survival patterns, the default
behavior of all creatures1.
STRATEGIC RECIPROCITY
We can begin with the capacity for strategic reciprocity, which is a salient
behavior in social primates and also, curiously, in vampire bats, but undescribed in other
social animals. Strategic reciprocity, also known as reciprocal altruism, refers to
behavior that we can summarize as “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine.” Selfinterest remains paramount – my back will be scratched, my coat will be groomed, my
status in the social hierarchy will be protected – and in exchange I will groom you and
form an alliance to protect your social status. The cultivation of strategic reciprocity
entails elaborate acts of cognition – I must remember who reciprocates and who cheats
or defects, I must burnish my reputation for being a cooperator, and so on – and humans
are astoundingly good at it. Our economic, political, and legal systems are heavily
grounded in strategic reciprocity, and it is of vast importance in structuring communities
that flourish. But in the end, strategic reciprocity is a game, a calculus, and indeed
computers can be programmed to be astoundingly good at it as well. After we finish
teaching our children that they should be good at strategic reciprocity if they are to
flourish in community, it feels like we still have much left to say to them about morality.
THE VIRTUES
So we can next turn to four moral capacities which, when cultivated, acquire the
status we often call virtues. Two of these we can designate as pro-social or valenced
virtues in the sense that their cultivation assures the flourishing of community. The first
is humaneness, which generates such responses as compassion, agape, benevolence,

and charity, and the second is fair-mindedness, which generates such responses as
justice, honesty, and trustworthiness. Primatologists have documented manifestations
of these traits in nonhuman primates, who are observed to engage in consolation, in
reconciliation, and in affection for one another and for one another’s offspring. I also find
most attractive the thesis, argued by Geoffrey Miller in his book The Mating Mind (2000),
that just as we favor humaneness and fair-mindedness in our choice of mates, so did
both capacities come to be reinforced by sexual selection during the 5 million years of
hominid evolution. Importantly, our ability to form abstract concepts, which develops
with maturation and education, allows us to enlarge these capacities such that we come
to extend humaneness and fair-mindedness to other human groups, thereby tempering
our susceptibility to xenophobia, and then as well to other species, to ecosystems, to the
planet itself. We come to care about suffering and injustice in all its manifestations.
There are no more promising antidotes than these for our susceptibilities to greed and
hubris.
The other two cardinal virtues – courage and reverence – are more complicated.
First let’s consider what they are.
When we speak of courage, as opposed to reflexive acts of self-defense or
defense of kin, we are speaking of the capacity to hold a large idea, a large passion, as
being more important than one’s own safety. So – the mountain climber is courageous
because conquering the mountain trumps her fear of falling; Martin Luther was
courageous because his religious conviction trumped his fear of papal authority.
Courage, I believe, is essential to human creativity: the passion to break new ground,
solve a problem, write a poem, is fueled by courage and defeated by fearfulness.
When we speak of reverence, which is celebrated in a new book of that title by
philosopher Paul Woodruff (2001), we are speaking of the capacity to carry the sense
that there are entities larger than the human being, and hence larger than the self, to
which one accords awe and gratitude and to which one develops obligation and
commitment. Theistic persons traditionally offer reverence towards a supernatural deity
or deities, whereas the nontheistic religious naturalist locates reverence in the natural
world, the material world, in all its wondrous manifestations and evolutionary history. We
speak of reverent family life, reverent leadership, reverent community. Reverence, in
whatever context, endows us with humility and hence defeats our susceptibility to selfabsorption.
The reason that courage and reverence are complicated virtues is that they are
inherently neutral, inherently unvalenced. Courage can be displayed in the name of any
ideal, and reverence can held for any ideal, as we so tragically witnessed on Sept. 11.
Courage and reverence can make bounteous contributions to the flourishing of
community, but they can also sabotage community and hijack the good.
This dilemma brings me to the final moral capacity on my list, the capacity for
mindfulness, which has been considered at length in a recent essay in Zygon coauthored with Paul Woodruff (2001). The paragraphs below are taken from that essay.
MINDFULNESS
Mindfulness represents the human capacity to take in understandings of reality
without the distortions introduced by need, bias, and prejudice. Rigidity, dogmatism, and

fundamentalism are antonyms to mindfulness -- mindfulness is constantly evolving,
ready for surprise.
Wisdom and knowledge are entailed by mindfulness, but mindfulness demands
more of us. It is knowledge or wisdom that pulls the mind-and-heart of the knower
towards a connection with the way things are in all their exciting particularity. You
cannot be mindful and know things in a purely academic way; as you become mindful of
something, your feelings and your behavior towards it are transformed.
Mindfulness is a central concept in Buddhism, where it is lifted up both as a
mental state and as a practice. The mindful person, Buddhism tells us, assumes the
attitude of pure observation, freed from all false views, and apprehends a reality that is
not only objective but also becomes subjective. The mindful person really really sees.
Mindfulness is also described as a path, a work in progress, rather than an
endpoint or achievement. This is because the mindful person is prepared to perceive
each particular situation in its uniqueness and respond to it appropriately.
In the broadest and deepest sense, the “naturalism” part of religious naturalism is
all about mindfulness. Scientists, trained in a particular kind of “pure observation,” have
provisioned us with stunning understandings of the natural world, and these
understandings then provision the religious naturalist with countless substrates for
mindful apprehension. So, for example, mindfulness of the body is no longer just about
breathing and walking as in the original Buddhist practice; we are now able to
contemplate as well the molecular and genetic underpinnings of the body and its
evolution from simpler forms.
The religious naturalist is called to be mindful of the following understandings
from biology:
· Mindful of our place in the scheme of things
· Mindful that life evolved, that humans are primates
· Mindful of the dynamics of molecular life and its emergent properties
· Mindful of the fragility of life and its ecosystems
· Mindful that life and the planet are wildly improbable
· Mindful that all of life is interconnected
· Mindful of the uniqueness of each creature
· Mindful of future generations
And from psychology and anthropology:
· Mindful that our thoughts and feelings are neural

· Mindful of the evolutionary continuity between our minds and other animals’ minds
· Mindful of human diversity, including diversity of temperament
· Mindful of human creativity and its wondrous manifestations
· Mindful of the influence of ethnic and family roots and tribal connection
· Mindful that children best flourish when loved and nurtured
· Mindful of the human need for personal wholeness and social coherence
Similar lists can be drawn from the physical sciences and the earth sciences,
from cultural history and imaginative literature, and so on. All such lists are expected to
be incomplete and open-ended. They are offered to remind us of what is at stake.
And now, a central claim. I would suggest that virtues, and particularly the
neutral virtues, will generate flourishing communities only to the extent that they are
mindful virtues. Mindfulness is a precondition for virtue and hence for morality, or,
rather, the cultivation of mindfulness and the cultivation of virtue must go together as an
essential collaboration if we are to attain moral maturity. The attacks of September 11
may have been executed in the name of reverence and courage, but it was neither
mindful reverence nor mindful courage.
MORAL SUSECPTIBILITIES
We can conclude by circling back to our moral susceptibilities. How do we go
about stacking the decks of our psyches, and our children’s psyches, so that
mindfulness trumps fundamentalism, mindful courage trumps fearfulness, humaneness
trumps hubris and xenophobia, fair-mindedness trumps greed, and mindful reverence
trumps self-absorption?
One way to stack the deck is through mindful moral education. From my
perspective, this is robustly feasible in the context of religious naturalism. Nor is the
project defeated by the naturalistic fallacy: our “Is” is that we are social animals; our
“Ought” is that we be good social animals. Importantly, religious naturalists are not
constrained to describing and celebrating moral concepts in the context of evolutionary
biology alone. The moral capacities and susceptibilities of which I speak are, needless
to say, embedded in the stories and rituals of all the major traditions – indeed, their
universality is yet another testimonial to their centrality to human nature – and there are
many ways to convey the rich meanings of these traditions to ourselves and our children
in naturalistic contexts.
A second way to stack the deck, obviously, is to ameliorate the conditions
wherein humans are physically or emotionally impoverished, threatened, defeated,
abused, humiliated, lonely, and insecure. Such conditions of prolonged stress induce us
to hunker down and render us vulnerable to fundamentalisms that promise deliverance.

HOPE
Hope is another one of those complicated human capacities, complicated in that it can
so often be elicited by false promise. But mindful hope, if we can speak of such a thing,
is perhaps what we most need in these times of ours.
FOOTNOTE
1

The wasps and ants are an informative exception. An ant colony can be analogized to
a multicellular organism, such as a human, where individual worker ants are, to a first
approximation, the equivalent of individual somatic cells. The ants, and the cells, are
genetically identical and individually sterile; their mandate is to cooperate in ensuring the
viability and reproductive success of the queen/germ line. A self-interested cell in a
human, focused only on its own replication, might generate a malignancy, but not
another human. A human has far more tenuous obligations to cooperate with other
humans in her/his community than a cell (or ant) to cooperate with other cells (ants):
human self-interest has not been discarded in the name of sociality.
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